Run Paseo from an official Docker image (#1740)

* Add Docker images and agent Docker Mods

Ship official container images that run the Paseo daemon headless. One
Dockerfile parametrized by BASE_IMAGE covers Debian 12/13, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04
and Alpine; it bundles Node 22, the npm-published server + CLI, a vendored
s6-overlay as PID 1, and a small Docker Mods loader.

Agents are chosen at runtime via DOCKER_MODS (pipe-separated mod images). Each
mod is a FROM scratch image carrying only an install hook that runs
`npm install -g <agent-cli>`; the loader pulls the layers from the registry,
extracts them, and runs the hook before the daemon starts, so any requested
agent is on PATH when Paseo probes provider availability.

- docker/base: Dockerfile, install scripts, s6 services, mods loader
- docker/mods/*: claude-code, codex, copilot, opencode, pi
- docker/docker-compose.example.yml + docker/README.md
- .github/workflows/docker.yml: multi-arch (amd64/arm64) buildx matrix,
  publishes to ghcr.io/getpaseo on version tags
- docs/docker.md + CLAUDE.md docs index row

* feat(docker): print pairing QR and link on daemon startup

Add an s6 oneshot service that waits for the daemon to listen, then runs
`paseo daemon pair` so the pairing QR code and link surface in the container
logs. Best-effort: never blocks boot, skips gracefully when relay is disabled.
Opt out with PASEO_PAIRING_QR=0.

* build(docker): add Arch image support

* ci(docker): build Arch without Buildx

* docs(docker): document paseo env contract

* feat(docker): add opt-in sudo mode

* docs(docker): link env references

* fix(docker): create agent config dirs

* fix(docker): default home to /home/paseo

* docs(docker): document agent auth setup

* docs(docker): document relay port setup

* fix(docker): install Node from tarball

* docs: add Docker quick start

* docs(docker): remove legacy home example

* docs(docker): set container hostname

* fix(docker): prepare opencode storage

* fix(docker): allow paseo login shell

* fix docker opencode permissions

* ci(docker): use Node 24 actions

* fix(docker): install bzip2 runtime tools

* fix(docker): update Pi mod package

* fix(docker): quiet default daemon logs

* fix(docker): split home from state

Docker images now keep HOME at /home/paseo and store Paseo daemon state under /home/paseo/.paseo by default.

Existing volumes can keep the old layout by setting PASEO_HOME=/home/paseo.

* fix(docker): keep mods out of paseo home

* ci(docker): skip alpine arm64 builds

* fix(docker): address review findings

* fix(docker): verify s6 overlay downloads

* fix(docker): honor custom healthcheck port

* fix(docker): fail on mod extraction errors

* feat(docker): add official container image

Ship a focused daemon image with the bundled web UI enabled and document extending it with agent CLIs.

* ci(docker): publish images only on stable releases

* fix(docker): check daemon health over HTTP

---------

Co-authored-by: Herbrant <cdavide98carnemolla@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mohamed Boudra
2026-06-26 14:48:13 +08:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Herbrant
parent 28c5e55bd9
commit 2c9db5279c
16 changed files with 832 additions and 2 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ Connected clients are trusted operators of the daemon user. File previews follow
If you expose the daemon beyond loopback, such as by binding to `0.0.0.0`, forwarding it through a tunnel or reverse proxy, or publishing it from a Docker container, you are responsible for restricting and securing that access. Setting a password is strongly recommended in that case.
In Docker, the official image runs the daemon and agents as the non-root
`paseo` user by default. Mounted workspaces and credentials are still fully
available to anything the agents run inside the container.
For remote access, use the relay connection. It is the supported path for reaching the daemon off-machine, and it adds end-to-end encryption plus a pairing handshake before commands are accepted.
Host header validation and CORS origin checks are defense-in-depth controls for localhost exposure. They help block DNS rebinding and browser-based attacks, but they do not replace network isolation.