Fix relay encryption docs (#849)
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@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ The relay is the simplest way to connect from your phone. It requires no VPN set
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1. The daemon generates a persistent ECDH keypair and stores it in `$PASEO_HOME/daemon-keypair.json`
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2. When you scan the QR code or click the pairing link, your phone receives the daemon's public key
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3. Your phone sends a handshake message with its own public key. The daemon will not accept any commands until this handshake completes.
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4. Both sides perform an ECDH key exchange to derive a shared secret. All subsequent messages are encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
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4. Both sides perform a Curve25519 ECDH key exchange to derive a shared key. All subsequent
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messages are encrypted with XSalsa20-Poly1305 (NaCl `box`).
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The relay sees only: IP addresses, timing, message sizes, and session IDs. It cannot read message contents, forge messages, or derive encryption keys from observing the handshake.
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@@ -40,8 +41,8 @@ The relay sees only: IP addresses, timing, message sizes, and session IDs. It ca
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The daemon requires a valid cryptographic handshake before processing any commands. A compromised relay cannot:
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- **Send commands**, Without your phone's private key, it cannot complete the handshake
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- **Read your traffic**, All messages are encrypted with AES-256-GCM after the handshake
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- **Forge messages**, GCM provides authenticated encryption; tampered messages are rejected
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- **Read your traffic**, All messages are encrypted with XSalsa20-Poly1305 (NaCl `box`) after the handshake
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- **Forge messages**, NaCl `box` provides authenticated encryption; tampered messages are rejected
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- **Replay old messages**, Each session derives fresh encryption keys
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### Trust model
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