Revert "Carry local files and shared state into new worktrees (#2419)"
This reverts commit cbbf6c1684.
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@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ The daemon also supports an optional shared-secret password (set via `auth.passw
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Connected clients are trusted operators of the daemon user. File previews follow that authority: a preview request may read any regular file the daemon process can read, while keeping path normalization and symlink checks in the daemon file service. Workspace-relative paths remain a UI convenience, not a security boundary.
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An explicit `symlink <path>` entry in a repository's .worktreeinclude intentionally gives a
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Paseo-created worktree live access to that source-checkout file or directory. It is useful for
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local dependencies and caches, but it weakens the usual worktree isolation: agents and lifecycle
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scripts can modify the source through the link. Paseo validates entries and refuses traversal or
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destination-link escapes, but the linked source is a deliberate shared-data boundary.
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If you expose the daemon beyond loopback, such as by binding to `0.0.0.0`, forwarding it through a tunnel or reverse proxy, or publishing it from a Docker container, you are responsible for restricting and securing that access. Setting a password is strongly recommended in that case.
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In Docker, the official image runs the daemon and agents as the non-root
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