Revert "Carry local files and shared state into new worktrees (#2419)"

This reverts commit cbbf6c1684.
This commit is contained in:
Mohamed Boudra
2026-07-30 00:37:52 +02:00
parent 20e46e3e3f
commit c6df5ffd4d
13 changed files with 145 additions and 2725 deletions
-6
View File
@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ The daemon also supports an optional shared-secret password (set via `auth.passw
Connected clients are trusted operators of the daemon user. File previews follow that authority: a preview request may read any regular file the daemon process can read, while keeping path normalization and symlink checks in the daemon file service. Workspace-relative paths remain a UI convenience, not a security boundary.
An explicit `symlink <path>` entry in a repository's .worktreeinclude intentionally gives a
Paseo-created worktree live access to that source-checkout file or directory. It is useful for
local dependencies and caches, but it weakens the usual worktree isolation: agents and lifecycle
scripts can modify the source through the link. Paseo validates entries and refuses traversal or
destination-link escapes, but the linked source is a deliberate shared-data boundary.
If you expose the daemon beyond loopback, such as by binding to `0.0.0.0`, forwarding it through a tunnel or reverse proxy, or publishing it from a Docker container, you are responsible for restricting and securing that access. Setting a password is strongly recommended in that case.
In Docker, the official image runs the daemon and agents as the non-root