feat(providers): add native options and exact MCP grants (#3025)
* feat(providers): add native options and exact MCP grants Keep provider policy in provider-owned schemas so unattended Hub runs can grant only requested tools from injected MCP servers. Preserve the native resolved sandbox policy when a workflow override is present, including configured writable roots. * test(hub): verify real provider tool policy * test(app): avoid pinning transient restart status
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@@ -47,11 +47,27 @@ replays the original prompt. A duplicate create returns the existing agent witho
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turn.
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Hub creates use the same agent creation path as trusted clients. They may select any existing
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worktree target shape and carry optional MCP server configuration for the agent session. The daemon
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keeps that configuration in its private agent record so provider sessions can recover after a
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restart; neither ordinary client snapshots and updates nor Hub projections expose session
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configuration. Execution completion policy remains outside the daemon: a completed agent turn does
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not imply that the Hub execution is terminal.
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worktree target shape and carry optional MCP server configuration and provider-native
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`providerOptions` for the agent session. The daemon keeps that configuration in its private agent
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record so provider sessions can recover after a restart; neither ordinary client snapshots and
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updates nor Hub projections expose session configuration. See [providers.md](providers.md) for the
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supported provider keys.
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Hub tool preapproval is a private, structured list of `{ kind: "mcp", server, tool }` references.
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Every reference must name an MCP server injected by the same create request. The daemon translates
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only those identities into the selected provider's native approval configuration. The protocol
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cannot name or preapprove native tools such as Bash, Edit, or Write. Explicit local or managed ask
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and deny policy takes precedence. Providers without exact MCP preapproval support reject unattended
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Hub creation instead of broadening access or waiting for an invisible prompt.
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When a create request includes a tool policy, a successful response includes
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`toolPolicyApplied: true`; absence of that acknowledgement is not success for unattended execution.
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A Hub workflow may use read-only provider settings for classifier steps. This is defense in depth,
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not a security boundary: classifier labels and prompt intent do not authorize tools. Exact MCP grants
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and the provider's local or managed policy remain the authorization controls.
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Execution completion policy remains outside the daemon: a completed agent turn does not imply that
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the Hub execution is terminal.
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The Hub ends an execution by sending `hub.execution.control.request` with the durable execution ID
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and either `interrupt` or `archive`. The daemon resolves the agent from the authenticated daemon
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@@ -91,3 +107,5 @@ The consumer implementation lives in Paseo Cloud. Cloud owns its copy of the Hub
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has no Paseo runtime or build dependency. Cross-repository end-to-end verification separately builds
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a Paseo source checkout and exercises the real daemon, CLI, direct WebSocket, Cloud service, and
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Postgres. That compatibility fixture is not a package dependency or fallback implementation.
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Its `hub-e2e` ACP provider accepts only exact tool names on the injected `hub` MCP server. Other
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custom ACP providers remain unsupported for unattended preapproval.
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