How will a sandboxed Pi session reach only its agent-scoped Paseo MCP endpoint and approved external destinations in both Linux topologies, given that daemon loopback is the sandbox itself? Choose a private gateway, route-specific proxy, or other narrow transport; define per-agent token issuance/binding/lifetime/revocation, firewall ownership, DNS behavior, selected-model and OAuth endpoint derivation, PI_OFFLINE behavior, denial semantics, and how launch-only MCP configuration stays out of persisted user config.
Part of #1
Blocked by: #2, #4, #8
## Question
How will a sandboxed Pi session reach only its agent-scoped Paseo MCP endpoint and approved external destinations in both Linux topologies, given that daemon loopback is the sandbox itself? Choose a private gateway, route-specific proxy, or other narrow transport; define per-agent token issuance/binding/lifetime/revocation, firewall ownership, DNS behavior, selected-model and OAuth endpoint derivation, PI_OFFLINE behavior, denial semantics, and how launch-only MCP configuration stays out of persisted user config.
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Part of #1
Blocked by: #2, #4, #8
Question
How will a sandboxed Pi session reach only its agent-scoped Paseo MCP endpoint and approved external destinations in both Linux topologies, given that daemon loopback is the sandbox itself? Choose a private gateway, route-specific proxy, or other narrow transport; define per-agent token issuance/binding/lifetime/revocation, firewall ownership, DNS behavior, selected-model and OAuth endpoint derivation, PI_OFFLINE behavior, denial semantics, and how launch-only MCP configuration stays out of persisted user config.