# SHD.build architecture

This project is intentionally being built in vertical slices.

## Planned stack

- SvelteKit 2 / Svelte 5 with TypeScript
- Embedded Turso Database via `@tursodatabase/database` for durable application data
- Auth.js-compatible server authentication with Discord OAuth and credentials providers
- Argon2id password hashing, server-side sessions, CSRF protection, and role checks
- Browser `localStorage` only for anonymous build drafts

## Product boundaries

- Public: browse, sort, and view published builds and guides.
- Anonymous: create and edit local drafts.
- Authenticated: publish, rate, comment, favorite, copy, and manage owned builds.
- Editor: manage builder source data.
- Admin: manage users, roles, source data, and audit history.

Authorization must be checked on the server for every mutation. Hiding an admin link is not authorization.

Local credentials are stored as Argon2id PHC strings with a unique random salt
per password. Current work factors follow OWASP's 19 MiB / 2 iteration /
single-lane minimum profile and can be increased over time; successful login
will eventually rehash credentials whose parameters are outdated.

## Database runtime

The application uses Turso Database in-process through its native Node package.
It opens a local SQLite-compatible database file and does not use Turso Cloud,
libSQL HTTP, remote replicas, auth tokens, or synchronization.

The database defaults to `./data/shd-build.db`. Production deployments must
provide a persistent writable filesystem and can override the location with
`TDR_DATABASE_PATH`. This rules out ephemeral serverless filesystems unless a
persistent volume is attached.

## Increment plan

1. Product shell and anonymous local-draft builder.
2. Embedded Turso migrations, repositories, and seed data.
3. Credentials and Discord authentication.
4. Full equipment/stat builder driven by database definitions.
5. Publishing, discovery, ratings, comments, favorites, and copy flow.
6. Rich build guides and moderation.
7. Admin editors, validation, audit log, and data import/export.
# Administrator bootstrap

The first successfully authenticated user is promoted to `admin` if the
database does not contain an administrator. Promotion uses one conditional
database update so concurrent first sign-ins cannot both become administrators.
Once an administrator exists, later sign-ins never alter roles.

# Database backup and restore

Embedded Turso databases contain contributor-entered source data and must be
preserved across development changes.

Create a timestamped development backup:

```sh
npm run db:backup
```

Create a production backup:

```sh
npm run db:backup:production
```

The scripts write versioned JSON documents beneath `data/backups/` by default.
That directory is ignored by Git because backups contain private user data,
including password hashes.

To restore, first create an empty database and apply the schema. Then run:

```sh
npm run db:restore -- data/backups/<backup-file>.json
```

The restore operation refuses to import into any database containing records.
This guard prevents accidental merging or overwriting of contributor data.
Stop the application before backup or restore so the embedded database file is
not locked by another process.

# ISAC audit and compensating reversals

Every successful ISAC mutation appends an event to `audit_log` through the
shared server audit utility. Events identify the operator, operational category,
specific action, target entity, timestamp, and useful before/after evidence.
The audit registry is read-only and requires `audit.view`; the seeded Auditor
role grants that permission without granting mutation capabilities.

Audit history is immutable. “Revert” is implemented as a new compensating
mutation rather than deletion or modification of the original event:

1. The operator must independently hold `audit.revert`.
2. The original action must be explicitly supported and contain a usable
   before-snapshot.
3. The UI requires a second, explicit confirmation.
4. The server reloads the target and compares it with the original
   after-snapshot, ignoring bookkeeping timestamps. A mismatch means newer work
   exists and blocks automatic compensation.
5. Referenced roles, permissions, and relationships are revalidated before
   restoration. Restoring administrator authority additionally requires full
   administrative access.
6. The server restores the previous state and appends an `audit.reverted` event
   whose target is the original audit-event ID.

# Moderated game-data contributions

ISAC data access is split into `data.view`, `data.propose`, `data.manage`, and
`data.approve`. Data Viewers can inspect registries. Data Contributors can submit
the same editor forms, but the request is serialized into `data_change_proposals`
instead of mutating canonical tables. Data Oversight reviews the queue and must
explicitly confirm approval or rejection.

Approval replays the stored form through its original SvelteKit server action.
This preserves canonical validation, relational updates, icon processing, and the
normal game-data audit event. Proposal creation and review decisions also produce
separate `data_moderation` audit events. Failed canonical validation marks a
proposal as failed without changing live data. Pending counts appear alongside
each data registry in ISAC so collaborators can see concurrent suggestions.

The protected seeded roles are Data Viewer, Data Contributor, Data Editor, and
Data Oversight. Data Editor retains direct-write access for trusted operators;
Data Oversight combines direct-write access with queue review. New ISAC data
modules must use the shared moderation interception path and audit both the final
mutation and proposal lifecycle.

Every authenticated, active registered agent receives `isac.access`,
`data.view`, and `data.propose` as baseline permissions in the authorization
layer. This baseline is intentionally implicit rather than a removable role
assignment, so it applies consistently to existing users and every account
creation method. Registered agents can inspect live source data and submit
moderated proposals, but cannot directly mutate canonical records, review the
queue, or access unrelated ISAC operations without additional permissions.
7. A successfully reverted event cannot be reverted again.

Unsupported destructive identity operations, account deletion, incomplete
snapshots, stale targets, and events whose dependencies no longer exist are
marked non-reversible or rejected. Recovery for those cases requires a
specialized workflow rather than inferred database writes.

# System metrics

The read-only `/admin/metrics` route requires `metrics.view` and collects a
point-in-time process-local health snapshot. Node and operating-system APIs
provide process CPU and memory, event-loop utilization and delay, host memory,
load average, core count, platform, and uptime. Embedded Turso pragmas provide
page allocation, page size, and free-page information; aggregate SQL queries
provide application record volumes.

The interface refreshes on demand and may poll every ten seconds while the
operator keeps auto-refresh enabled. CPU and event-loop values are deltas from
the previous server-side sample, so the first or infrequently requested sample
is directional rather than a monitoring-grade time series. Production alerting
and historical analysis should eventually use a dedicated external telemetry
system. This surface deliberately omits secrets, environment-variable values,
and full database paths.

# Weapon-owned exotic talents

Standard weapon talent pools remain globally reusable and classified by Talent
1 / Top or Talent 2 / Bottom. An exotic talent is different: one exotic weapon
owns one dedicated talent, referenced by `weapons.exotic_talent_id`.

The weapon editor creates and updates the underlying normalized `talents`,
`talent_tiers`, trigger links, effect links, description template, and Exotic
weapon scope together with the weapon. Server validation rejects an exotic
talent ID not already owned by the edited weapon and rejects any talent shared
by another weapon. Converting a weapon back to standard clears the relationship
and archives its now-unowned exotic talent. Exotic talent creation and editing
are rejected by the shared Talent Registry so ownership cannot be bypassed.

# OS Protocol progression

OS Protocols use dedicated normalized tables because their talent progression
has six calculated states (base plus five upgrades) rather than the shared
two-tier talent model. Each protocol owns one `os_protocol_primary_effects`
record and one `os_protocol_talents` record. Talent effects and reusable
triggers live in their respective join tables.

The three secondary attributes are normalized separately. One
`os_protocol_secondary_profiles` record exists for each configured quality +
attribute-type combination, with its three fixed stat/value pairs in
`os_protocol_secondary_effects`. Every matching protocol inherits that profile;
secondary values are not copied onto individual protocol records.

The unique primary value uses `base × (1 + (level − 1) / 49)` for levels 1–50, while
talent effects use `base × (1 + upgrades / 5)` for zero to five upgrades.
Server actions validate all relationships and append the full owned graph to
the existing `game_data` audit history.

# Skill Chip quality scaling

Skill Chip sets support Superior and High-end chip instances. Each set owns one
2-piece bonus, distinct primary and secondary stat-option pools, and one
3-piece talent with reusable trigger links and normalized effect rows. Primary
and secondary options reference active attributes that define Skill Chip
minimum and maximum roll values; a configured chip rolls one primary and two
distinct secondary stats from those separate pools.

Both set-bonus progression systems use the number of equipped High-end chips as
the interpolation step. For `h` High-end chips, where `h` is zero through
three, a configured minimum and maximum resolve as
`minimum + (maximum − minimum) × h / 3`. Zero High-end chips therefore produce
the minimum, while three produce the maximum. The editor stores only endpoints
and previews all four states, preventing duplicated tier data from diverging.
Skill Chip mutations, owned relationships, and safe icon metadata are captured
in the `game_data` audit stream.

# Game-data icon storage

Talents, brand sets, OS Protocols, and Skill Chips reference uploaded artwork through the
polymorphic `game_data_icons` metadata table. Original uploads are never
retained. The shared server pipeline accepts transparent SVG, PNG, WebP, and
AVIF sources, rejects active or externally referenced SVG content, and uses
Sharp’s asynchronous native worker pool to rasterize and normalize every
accepted icon to a transparent 256 × 256 WebP.

Normalized files live beneath the ignored `data/game-icons/` directory and are
served by the validated `/icons/game-data/[type]/[id]` endpoint with immutable
cache headers and MIME sniffing disabled. ISAC save actions process files
before mutation, apply upload or removal after record validation, and include
only safe icon metadata—not image bytes—in their audit snapshots.