268 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
268 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
# SHD.build architecture
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This project is intentionally being built in vertical slices.
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## Planned stack
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- SvelteKit 2 / Svelte 5 with TypeScript
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- Embedded Turso Database via `@tursodatabase/database` for durable application data
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- Auth.js-compatible server authentication with Discord OAuth and credentials providers
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- Argon2id password hashing, server-side sessions, CSRF protection, and role checks
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- Browser `localStorage` only for anonymous build drafts
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## Product boundaries
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- Public: browse, sort, and view published builds and guides.
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- Anonymous: create and edit local drafts.
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- Authenticated: publish, rate, comment, favorite, copy, and manage owned builds.
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- Editor: manage builder source data.
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- Admin: manage users, roles, source data, and audit history.
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Authorization must be checked on the server for every mutation. Hiding an admin link is not authorization.
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Weapon and gear range calculations must preserve unrounded decimal endpoints
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and follow the empirically validated progression rules in
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[`STAT_LEVEL_SCALING.md`](STAT_LEVEL_SCALING.md). In particular, leveling is
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linear rather than compounded and game-matching integer values are truncated
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only at the presentation boundary.
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Local credentials are stored as Argon2id PHC strings with a unique random salt
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per password. Current work factors follow OWASP's 19 MiB / 2 iteration /
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single-lane minimum profile and can be increased over time; successful login
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will eventually rehash credentials whose parameters are outdated.
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## Database runtime
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The application uses Turso Database in-process through its native Node package.
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It opens a local SQLite-compatible database file and does not use Turso Cloud,
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libSQL HTTP, remote replicas, auth tokens, or synchronization.
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The database defaults to `./data/shd-build.db`. Production deployments must
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provide a persistent writable filesystem and can override the location with
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`TDR_DATABASE_PATH`. This rules out ephemeral serverless filesystems unless a
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persistent volume is attached.
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## Increment plan
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1. Product shell and anonymous local-draft builder.
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2. Embedded Turso migrations, repositories, and seed data.
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3. Credentials and Discord authentication.
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4. Full equipment/stat builder driven by database definitions.
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5. Publishing, discovery, ratings, comments, favorites, and copy flow.
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6. Rich build guides and moderation.
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7. Admin editors, validation, audit log, and data import/export.
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# Administrator bootstrap
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The first successfully authenticated user is promoted to `admin` if the
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database does not contain an administrator. Promotion uses one conditional
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database update so concurrent first sign-ins cannot both become administrators.
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Once an administrator exists, later sign-ins never alter roles.
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# Database backup and restore
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Embedded Turso databases contain contributor-entered source data and must be
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preserved across development changes.
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Create a timestamped development backup:
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```sh
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npm run db:backup
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```
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Create a production backup:
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```sh
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npm run db:backup:production
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```
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The scripts write versioned JSON documents beneath `data/backups/` by default.
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That directory is ignored by Git because backups contain private user data,
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including password hashes.
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To restore, first create an empty database and apply the schema. Then run:
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```sh
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npm run db:restore -- data/backups/<backup-file>.json
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```
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The restore operation refuses to import into any database containing records.
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This guard prevents accidental merging or overwriting of contributor data.
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Stop the application before backup or restore so the embedded database file is
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not locked by another process.
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## Low-downtime development migrations
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The development database is a shared working data source: contributors may be
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entering ISAC records while application development continues. Database changes
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therefore use a prepared migration window rather than taking the server down at
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the beginning of implementation.
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Before the window, finish the code and idempotent migration, batch related
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schema changes, identify verification queries, and run `npm run check` plus
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`npm run build` while the server remains available. Prefer additive,
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backward-compatible tables and safely defaulted or nullable columns. Coordinate
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with known contributors so the stop does not interrupt an unsaved submission.
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The offline window is deliberately narrow:
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1. Inspect running processes and stop only this project's development server.
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2. Run and verify `npm run db:backup`.
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3. Run the already-prepared migration.
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4. Verify expected schema state, record counts, and critical entities.
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5. Restart the development server immediately.
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6. Confirm a basic page or health check, then perform extended browser and
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regression testing with the service online.
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Code editing, builds, formatting, documentation review, and noncritical UI
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testing do not belong inside this window. Destructive, data-rewriting, or
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long-running migrations require a separately communicated maintenance window
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and a verified recovery plan. Every migration handoff reports the backup path,
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migration outcome, successful server restart, critical checks, and the
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approximate offline interval when available.
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# ISAC audit and compensating reversals
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Every successful ISAC mutation appends an event to `audit_log` through the
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shared server audit utility. Events identify the operator, operational category,
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specific action, target entity, timestamp, and useful before/after evidence.
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The audit registry is read-only and requires `audit.view`; the seeded Auditor
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role grants that permission without granting mutation capabilities.
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Audit history is immutable. “Revert” is implemented as a new compensating
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mutation rather than deletion or modification of the original event:
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1. The operator must independently hold `audit.revert`.
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2. The original action must be explicitly supported and contain a usable
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before-snapshot.
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3. The UI requires a second, explicit confirmation.
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4. The server reloads the target and compares it with the original
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after-snapshot, ignoring bookkeeping timestamps. A mismatch means newer work
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exists and blocks automatic compensation.
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5. Referenced roles, permissions, and relationships are revalidated before
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restoration. Restoring administrator authority additionally requires full
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administrative access.
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6. The server restores the previous state and appends an `audit.reverted` event
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whose target is the original audit-event ID.
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# Moderated game-data contributions
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ISAC data access is split into `data.view`, `data.propose`, `data.manage`, and
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`data.approve`. Data Viewers can inspect registries. Data Contributors can submit
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the same editor forms, but the request is serialized into `data_change_proposals`
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instead of mutating canonical tables. Data Oversight reviews the queue and must
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explicitly confirm approval or rejection.
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Approval replays the stored form through its original SvelteKit server action.
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This preserves canonical validation, relational updates, icon processing, and the
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normal game-data audit event. Proposal creation and review decisions also produce
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separate `data_moderation` audit events. Failed canonical validation marks a
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proposal as failed without changing live data. Pending counts appear alongside
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each data registry in ISAC so collaborators can see concurrent suggestions.
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The protected seeded roles are Data Viewer, Data Contributor, Data Editor, and
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Data Oversight. Data Editor retains direct-write access for trusted operators;
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Data Oversight combines direct-write access with queue review. New ISAC data
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modules must use the shared moderation interception path and audit both the final
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mutation and proposal lifecycle.
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Every authenticated, active registered agent receives `isac.access`,
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`data.view`, and `data.propose` as baseline permissions in the authorization
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layer. This baseline is intentionally implicit rather than a removable role
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assignment, so it applies consistently to existing users and every account
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creation method. Registered agents can inspect live source data and submit
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moderated proposals, but cannot directly mutate canonical records, review the
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queue, or access unrelated ISAC operations without additional permissions.
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7. A successfully reverted event cannot be reverted again.
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Unsupported destructive identity operations, account deletion, incomplete
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snapshots, stale targets, and events whose dependencies no longer exist are
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marked non-reversible or rejected. Recovery for those cases requires a
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specialized workflow rather than inferred database writes.
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# System metrics
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ISAC uses `/isac` as its canonical route namespace. The server permanently
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redirects legacy `/admin` URLs to their matching `/isac` location so old
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notifications and external bookmarks remain usable.
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The read-only `/isac/metrics` route requires `metrics.view` and collects a
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point-in-time process-local health snapshot. Node and operating-system APIs
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provide process CPU and memory, event-loop utilization and delay, host memory,
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load average, core count, platform, and uptime. Embedded Turso pragmas provide
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page allocation, page size, and free-page information; aggregate SQL queries
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provide application record volumes.
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The interface refreshes on demand and may poll every ten seconds while the
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operator keeps auto-refresh enabled. CPU and event-loop values are deltas from
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the previous server-side sample, so the first or infrequently requested sample
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is directional rather than a monitoring-grade time series. Production alerting
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and historical analysis should eventually use a dedicated external telemetry
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system. This surface deliberately omits secrets, environment-variable values,
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and full database paths.
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# Weapon-owned exotic talents
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Standard weapon talent pools remain globally reusable and classified by Talent
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1 / Top or Talent 2 / Bottom. An exotic talent is different: one exotic weapon
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owns one dedicated talent, referenced by `weapons.exotic_talent_id`.
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The weapon editor creates and updates the underlying normalized `talents`,
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`talent_tiers`, trigger links, effect links, description template, and Exotic
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weapon scope together with the weapon. Server validation rejects an exotic
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talent ID not already owned by the edited weapon and rejects any talent shared
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by another weapon. Converting a weapon back to standard clears the relationship
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and archives its now-unowned exotic talent. Exotic talent creation and editing
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are rejected by the shared Talent Registry so ownership cannot be bypassed.
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# OS Protocol progression
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OS Protocols use dedicated normalized tables because their talent progression
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has six calculated states (base plus five upgrades) rather than the shared
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two-tier talent model. Each protocol owns one `os_protocol_primary_effects`
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record and one `os_protocol_talents` record. Talent effects and reusable
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triggers live in their respective join tables.
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The three secondary attributes are normalized separately. One
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`os_protocol_secondary_profiles` record exists for each configured quality +
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attribute-type combination, with its three fixed stat/value pairs in
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`os_protocol_secondary_effects`. Every matching protocol inherits that profile;
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secondary values are not copied onto individual protocol records.
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The unique primary value uses `base × (1 + (level − 1) / 49)` for levels 1–50, while
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talent effects use `base × (1 + upgrades / 5)` for zero to five upgrades.
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Server actions validate all relationships and append the full owned graph to
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the existing `game_data` audit history.
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# Skill Chip quality scaling
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Skill Chip sets support Superior and High-end chip instances. Each set owns one
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2-piece bonus, distinct primary and secondary stat-option pools, and one
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3-piece talent with reusable trigger links and normalized effect rows. Primary
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and secondary options reference active attributes that define Skill Chip
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minimum and maximum roll values; a configured chip rolls one primary and two
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distinct secondary stats from those separate pools.
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Both set-bonus progression systems use the number of equipped High-end chips as
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the interpolation step. For `h` High-end chips, where `h` is zero through
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three, a configured minimum and maximum resolve as
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`minimum + (maximum − minimum) × h / 3`. Zero High-end chips therefore produce
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the minimum, while three produce the maximum. The editor stores only endpoints
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and previews all four states, preventing duplicated tier data from diverging.
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Skill Chip mutations, owned relationships, and safe icon metadata are captured
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in the `game_data` audit stream.
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# Game-data icon storage
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Talents, brand sets, OS Protocols, and Skill Chips reference uploaded artwork through the
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polymorphic `game_data_icons` metadata table. Original uploads are never
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retained. The shared server pipeline accepts transparent SVG, PNG, WebP, and
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AVIF sources, rejects active or externally referenced SVG content, and uses
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Sharp’s asynchronous native worker pool to rasterize and normalize every
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accepted icon to a transparent 256 × 256 WebP.
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Normalized files live beneath the ignored `data/game-icons/` directory and are
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served by the validated `/icons/game-data/[type]/[id]` endpoint with immutable
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cache headers and MIME sniffing disabled. ISAC save actions process files
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before mutation, apply upload or removal after record validation, and include
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only safe icon metadata—not image bytes—in their audit snapshots.
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